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Abstract
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-oﬀ between marginalism and egalitarian-
ism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-oﬀ can be framed as one of choosing
to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we
provide tools that make it possible to study this trade-oﬀ in a consistent way by providing
three types of results on egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shap-
ley value and the equal division solution. First, we show that all these solutions satisfy
the same reduced game consistency . Second, we characterize this class of solutions using
monotonicity properties. Finally, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these
solutions which only diﬀer in the probability of breakdown at a certain stage of the game.
Keywords: Shapley value, Equal division solution, Egalitarian Shapley value, Reduced
Game Consistency, Monotonicity, Implementation
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1 Introduction
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-oﬀ between marginalism and egalitar-
ianism. In this paper we consider this issue in the context of cooperative games with
transferable utility. For these games the trade-oﬀ between marginalism and egalitarianism
can be seen as the trade-oﬀ between allocating according to the Shapley value or the equal
division solution. Both solutions consider situations where eventually the ‘grand coaliton’
consisting of all players forms. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) assigns to every player
its expected marginal contribution to this coalition assuming that all possible orders of
entrance of the players occur with equal probability. Here, the marginal contribution of
a player to a coalition is the increase in transferable utility when this player joins the
coalition. The marginalist characteristic of the Shapley value is most clearly formulated by
Young (1985) who characterized it as the unique solution that is eﬃcient, symmetric and
strongly monotonic. This strong monotonicity states that the payoﬀs of a player do not
decrease if its marginal contributions to coalitions do not decrease. Since symmetry (i.e.
equal treatment of equals) is usually considered a desirable property, and under complete
information also eﬃciency is widely accepted, this result says that the Shapley value is
the only solution in which the utility payoﬀ of a player is fully determined by its marginal
contributions to the transferable utility of coalitions1.
On the other hand, the equal division solution which allocates the worth of the grand
coalition equally among all players, can be seen as the most egalitarian solution for such
games. The trade-oﬀ between marginalism and egalitarianism can be made by considering
convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. This class of
solutions is introduced by Joosten (1996) and are called egalitarian Shapley values . In order
to consider these solutions as making a trade-oﬀ between marginalism and egalitarianism
we need to provide results that not only show the diﬀerence between these solutions, but
also their similarities. We do this by providing three types of results that are very common
in game theory: consistency, monotonicity and implementation.
First, we show that all these solutions satisfy the reduced game consistency that is
used by Sobolev (1973) to characterize the Shapley value. In these reduced games, after a
particular player leaves the game with its payoﬀ, the remaining coalitions assume with a
probability that is proportional to their cardinality that the leaving player cooperates with
them or not. Reduced game consistency requires that players respect the recommendations
made by the solution in the sense that the solution assigns to the players in the reduced
game the same payoﬀs as it assigns to those players in the original game. However, the
1As already noticed by Young (1985) it is sufficient to weaken strong monotonicity to marginalism
stating that the payoff of a player in two games is equal if all its marginal contributions are equal in both
games.
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egalitarian Shapley values diﬀer with respect to the standardness for two-player games that
they satisfy. The usual standardness for two-player games which is satisﬁed by the Shapley
value states that in a two player game every player earns its own worth plus half of what
remains of the worth of the two-player (‘grand’) coalition (see, e.g. Hart and Mas-Colell
(1988, 1989)). Egalitarian standardness states that in two player games the worth of the
grand coalition is split equally among the two players. For general egalitarian Shapley
values the ‘sharing of the surplus’ depends on the weights put on the Shapley value and
equal division solution. Since all these solutions share the same reduced game consistency,
the diﬀerence thus boils down to the allocation that is applied in two-player games.
The second characterization is based on monotonicity properties. Above we already
refered to the characterization of the Shapley value by eﬃciency, symmetry and strong
monotonicity (or marginalism) in Young (1985). Since all egalitarian Shapley values sat-
isfy eﬃciency and symmetry, this implies that the Shapley value is the unique egalitarian
Shapley value that is strongly monotonic. However, it turns out that all egalitarian Shapley
values satisfy the weaker property which states that the payoﬀ of a player does not de-
crease if its marginal contributions do not decrease and, moreover, the worth of the ‘grand
coalition’ does not decrease. This is a considerable weakening of the strong monotonicity
property. Since the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is what is to be allocated by any eﬃcient
solution, strong monotonicity requires that the payoﬀ of a player does not decrease if its
marginal contributions do not decrease irrespective of what is to be allocated, which is a
very strong requirement. However, if the worth to be allocated is not decreasing then this
requirement on the payoﬀs seems reasonable for a marginalistic solution. We show that
the class of egalitarian Shapley values is characterized by this weak monotonicity together
with the well-known properties of eﬃciency, linearity and local monotonicity.
Whereas the above two characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley values give a
cooperative foundation (on a variable, respectively, ﬁxed player set), our third result pro-
vides a non-cooperative foundation by implementing the egalitarian Shapley values as the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in an extensive form bidding mechanism.
This bidding mechanism generalizes the one for the Shapley value given in Pe´rez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001), diﬀering only in an additional possibility of breakdown of the nego-
tiations. The bidding mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) starts with all
players and proceeds in various rounds that each have four stages. In the ﬁrst stage all
players that are still ‘in the game’ make bids to all other bidders showing their willing-
ness to become the proposer. A player with the highest ‘net bid’ becomes the proposer.
In stage 2 the proposer makes (additional) payoﬀ oﬀers to the other players. In stage 3
these other players either accept or reject the proposal. Finally, in stage 4 payoﬀs or the
continuation of the game is determined. If all others accept the proposal then they all get
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their oﬀers and the proposer earns what remains. If at least one of them rejects then the
proposer leaves the game with its stand-alone payoﬀ and the others continue the bidding
game without the proposer, starting again at stage 1 (of the next round). The bidding
game thus ends when either all remaining players accept the proposal or the last player
leaves the game. Our bidding mechanism only diﬀers from that of Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001) in the sense that at the end of the ﬁrst round, after the oﬀer is rejected
there is an additional possibility that the negotiations breakdown and all players earn zero
payoﬀ. The probability of breakdown is determined by the weights put on the Shapley
value and equal division solution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some preliminaries on cooperative
games with transferable utility and solutions. In Section 3 we provide the characterization
using standardness and reduced game consistency. In Section 4 we provide a characteriza-
tion of the class of egalitarian Shapley values using monotonicity properties. In Section 5
we provide an implementation of the egalitarian Shapley values. Finally, Section 6 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being
a pair (N, v), where N ⊂ IN is a ﬁnite set of players and v: 2N → R is a characteristic
function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is called the worth of
coalition S. This is the transferable utility that the members of coalition S can obtain by
agreeing to cooperate. We denote the class of all TU-games by G. A TU-game (N, v) is
monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N . The unanimity game of coalition T ⊆ N ,
T 
= ∅, on N is the monotone game (N, uT ) given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0
otherwise. In the sequel we denote n = |N | for the number of players in N . For generic
coalitions S ⊆ N we denote s = |S|.
A payoff vector of game (N, v) is an n-dimensional real vector x ∈ IRn which rep-
resents a distribution of the payoﬀs that can be earned by cooperation over the individual
players. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games is a function ψ which assigns a payoﬀ
vector ψ(N, v) ∈ Rn to every TU-game (N, v) ∈ G such that ψi({i}, v) = v({i}) for all
i ∈ IN. Two well-known solutions are the Shapley value and the equal division solution.
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is the solution that assigns to every TU-game (N, v)
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the payoﬀ vector
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
(v(S)− v(S \ {i})) for all i ∈ N.
The equal division solution is the solution that distributes the worth v(N) of the ‘grand
coalition’ equally among all players and thus assigns to every TU-game (N, v) the payoﬀ
vector
EDi(N, v) =
v(N)
n
for all i ∈ N.
Joosten (1996) introduced a new class of solutions that are obtained as convex combinations
of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. For every α ∈ [0, 1], he deﬁnes the
α-egalitarian Shapley value ϕα as the solution given by
ϕα(N, v) = αSh(N, v) + (1− α)ED(N, v).
By Φ = {ϕα | α ∈ [0, 1]} we denote the class of all α-egalitarian Shapley values and refer to
a generic solution in this class as an egalitarian Shapley value. Some well-known properties
of solutions for TU-games are the following. Solution ψ
• is efficient2 if
∑
i∈N ψi(N, v) = v(N) for all (N, v) ∈ G.
• is linear if ψ(N, av + bw) = aψ(N, v) + bψ(N,w) for all (N, v), (N,w) ∈ G, where
av + bw is given by (av + bw)(S) = av(S) + bw(S) for all S ⊆ N .
• is symmetric if ψi(N, v) = ψj(N, v) for all (N, v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N such that v(S ∪
{i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
• satisﬁes local monotonicity if ψi(N, v) ≥ ψj(N, v) for all (N, v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N such
that v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
• satisﬁes strong monotonicity if ψi(N, v) ≥ ψi(N,w) for every pair of games (N, v), (N,w)
and i ∈ N such that v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≥ w(S ∪ {i})− w(S) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}.
• satisﬁes α-standardness for two-player games , α ∈ [0, 1], if for every (N, v) ∈ G with
N = {i, j}, i 
= j, it holds that ψi(N, v) =
α
2
(v({i})− v({j})) + 1
2
v(N).
Speciﬁc choices of α ∈ [0, 1] give diﬀerent versions of standardness for two-player games
as encountered in the literature. Taking α = 1 yields standardness for two-player games
as considered in, e.g. Hart and Mas-Colell (1988,1989): ψi(N, v) =
1
2
v({i}) − 1
2
v({j}) +
2Efficient solutions are often called values.
4
1
2
v(N) = v({i}) + 1
2
(v(N) − v({i}) − v({j})) with N = {i, j}. Taking α = 0, yields
egalitarian standardness for two-player games : ψi(N, v) =
1
2
v(N) for i ∈ N .
It is known that the Shapley value satisﬁes standardness and the equal division
solution satisﬁes egalitarian standardness for two-player games. Joosten (1996) showed that
for α ∈ [0, 1], the α-egalitarian Shapley value ϕα satisﬁes the corresponding α-standardness
for two-player games.
3 Consistency
In the literature various reduced game properties are discussed. Suppose that one player
leaves a game with some payoﬀ. Reduced games describe what games are played between
the remaining players, i.e. what is earned by coalitions of the remaining players after one
player has left the game. The worths of coalitions in the reduced games usually depend
on (i) the worths that these coalitions could earn on their own in the original game, (ii)
what these coalitions could earn with the leaving player and (iii) the payoﬀ with which
the leaving player left the game. One of the oldest reduced games is the following that
is introduced by Sobolev (1973). Consider a game (N, v), a payoﬀ vector x ∈ IRn, and
a player j ∈ N . Suppose player j leaves the game with its payoﬀ xj . In the reduced
game between the remaining players the coalition N \ {j}, being the ‘grand coalition’ in
the reduced game, earns the worth of N minus the payoﬀ xj. Clearly, this is what is
left to be allocated among the players in N \ {j} after player j has left the game with
payoﬀ xj. In Sobolev’s reduced game any coalition S ⊆ N \ {j} either has (or thinks it
has) the cooperation of the leaving player j but must pay for j’s payoﬀ and thus earns
v(S∪{j})−xj , or is on its own and earns its own worth v(S). The probability with which
a coalition S has the cooperation of j depends on the cardinality of S. More precisely, with
probability s
n−1 coalition S ⊂ N \ {j} has j’s cooperation and thus earns v(S ∪ {j})− xj ,
and with probability 1− s
n−1
= n−1−s
n−1
coalition S ⊂ N \ {j} is on its own and earns v(S).
Definition 3.1 Given game (N, v) ∈ G, player j ∈ N , and efficient payoff vector x ∈ RN ,
the reduced game with respect to j and x is the game (N \ {j}, vx) given by
vx(S) =
s
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {j})− xj) +
n− 1− s
n− 1
v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ {j}.
Note that indeed vx(N \{j}) = v(N)−xj. Consistency with respect to a particular reduced
game means that given a game (N, v), if x is a solution payoﬀ vector for (N, v), then for
every player j ∈ N , the payoﬀ vector xN\{j} with payoﬀs for the players in N \ {j}, must
be a solution payoﬀ vector of the reduced game (N \ {j}, vx). It is a kind of internal
consistency requirement to guarantee that players respect the recommendations made by
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the solution. In the following we refer to consistency with respect to the reduced game
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.1 just as consistency3.
Definition 3.2 Let ψ be a solution on G. Solution ψ satisfies consistency on G if
and only if for every (N, v) ∈ G with n ≥ 2, j ∈ N , and x = ψ(N, v) it holds that
ψi(N \ {j}, vx) = ψi(N, v) for all i ∈ N \ {j}.
Sobolev (1973) showed that the Shapley value is the unique solution that satisﬁes this
consistency and is standard for two-player games. Surprisingly, also the equal division
solution satisﬁes this consistency. We can even state the following more general result for
all egalitarian Shapley values.
Proposition 3.3 Every egalitarian Shapley value ϕα, α ∈ [0, 1], satisfies consistency.
Proof
Take j ∈ N , S ⊆ N \{j} and any eﬃcient payoﬀ vector z. Recall that n = |N | and s = |S|.
First, for a reduced game (N \ {j}, vz), for any i ∈ N \ {j} and S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, it follows
that
vz(S ∪ {i})− vz(S) =
s+ 1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {i, j})− zj) +
n− s− 2
n− 1
v(S ∪ {i})
−
s
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {j})− zj)−
n− s− 1
n− 1
v(S)
=
s+ 1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j})) +
1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {j})− zj)
+
n− s− 1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))−
1
n− 1
v(S ∪ {i})
=
s+ 1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j})) +
n− s− 1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
+
1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}))−
1
n− 1
zj .
Then, for all i, j ∈ N, i 
= j, the Shapley value for player i in the reduced game with
respect to j and z can be written as
Shi(N \ {j}, v
z) =
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
(vz(S ∪ {i})− vz(S))
3We only consider the class G of all TU-games. If one considers subclasses C ⊂ G, then in the definition
of consistency one should aditionally require that the reduced games (N \ {j}, vx) also belong to C.
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=
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
·
s+ 1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j}))
+
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
·
n− s− 1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
+
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
·
1
n− 1
(v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}))
−
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
·
1
n− 1
zj
=
1
n− 1

 ∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
(s+ 1)!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j}))
+
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 1)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
+
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}))− zj

=
1
n− 1
( ∑
S⊆N,S∋j
s!(n− s− 1)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
+
∑
S⊆N,S∋/ j
s!(n− s− 1)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))

+
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}))− zj
 (3.1)
=
1
n− 1
Shi(N, v) + ∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}))− zj
 .
Take y = Sh(N, v). By Sobolev (1973) we have Shi(N, v) = Shi(N \ {j}, vy) for all i, j ∈
N, i 
= j. Thus, with (3.1) it follows that
Shi(N, v)+
yj
n− 1
=
1
n− 1

Shi(N, v) + ∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}))

 . (3.2)
Let x = ϕα(N, v). By applying (3.1) and (3.2) to x, we have, for any i, j ∈ N, i 
= j,
ϕαi (N \ {j}, v
x) = αShi(N \ {j}, v
x) + (1− α)
vx(N \ {j})
n− 1
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=
α
n− 1
Shi(N, v) + ∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)!
(v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}))− xj

+(1− α)
v(N)− xj
n− 1
= α
(
Shi(N, v) +
yj
n− 1
−
xj
n− 1
)
+ (1− α)
v(N)− xj
n− 1
= αShi(N, v) + α
yj
n− 1
−
xj
n− 1
+ (1− α)
v(N)
n− 1
= αShi(N, v) + α
yj
n− 1
−
αyj + (1− α)
v(N)
n
n− 1
+ (1− α)
v(N)
n− 1
= αShi(N, v) + (1− α)
v(N)
n
= ϕαi (N, v),
where the ﬁrst equality follows by deﬁnition of ϕα, the second equality follows from (3.1)
and the third equality follows from (3.2). 
Sobolev (1973) characterized the Shapley value as the unique solution that satisﬁes con-
sistency and standardness for two-player games. Since in Proposition 3.3 we showed that
all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy the same consistency, the Shapley value is the unique
egalitarian Shapley value satisfying standardness for two-player games. However, the α-
egalitarian Shapley value satisﬁes the corresponding α-standardness for two-player games.
For any α ∈ [0, 1] these two axioms characterize the corresponding egalitarian Shapley
value.
Theorem 3.4 Take any α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution ψ satisfies consistency and α-standardness
for two-player games if and only if ψ = ϕα.
Proof
Since it is straightforward that ϕα satisﬁes α-standardness for two-player games, by Propo-
sition 3.3 we are left to show uniqueness. Suppose that solution ψ satisﬁes the two prop-
erties of the theorem. We will show that ψ(N, v) = ϕα(N, v) for any game (N, v) ∈ G. For
n = 1 by deﬁnition of a solution we have ψi({i}, v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ IN. For n = 2,
α-standardness of ψ and ϕα implies that they are equal. Proceeding by induction, suppose
that ψ(N ′, v′) = ϕα(N ′, v′) whenever 2 ≤ |N ′| < n.
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Let x = ψ(N, v) and y = ϕα(N, v). Take any i, j ∈ N, i 
= j, and consider the two reduced
games (N \ {j}, vx), (N \ {j}, vy). Then,
xi − yi = ψi(N, v)− ϕ
α
i (N, v)
= ψi(N \ {j}, v
x)− ϕαi (N \ {j}, v
y)
= ϕαi (N \ {j}, v
x)− ϕαi (N \ {j}, v
y)
= α (Shi(N \ {j}, v
x)− Shi(N \ {j}, v
y))
+(1− α) (EDi(N \ {j}, v
x)−EDi(N \ {j}, v
y))
= α
(
−
(xj − yj)
n− 1
)
+ (1− α)
yj − xj
n− 1
=
(
yj − xj
n− 1
)
,
where the second equality follows since both solutions ψ and ϕα satisfy consistency, the
third equality follows by the induction hypothesis, the fourth equality follows by deﬁnition
of ϕα and the ﬁfth equality follows from (3.1). Thus, for all i, j ∈ N, i 
= j, we have
xi − yi =
yj − xj
n− 1
.
Since n ≥ 3, it must hold that xi − yi = 0 for all i ∈ N , and thus ψ(N, v) = ϕα(N, v). 
As a corollary we obtain an axiomatization of the class of egalitarian Shapley values with
axioms that do not depend on α. We say that a solution ψ satisﬁes weak standardness for
two-player games if there exists an α ∈ [0, 1] such that for every (N, v) ∈ G with n = 2, ψ
satisﬁes α-standardness for two-player games.
Corollary 3.5 A solution ψ satisfies consistency and weak standardness for two-player
games if and only if ψ is an egalitarian Shapley value.
Note that, although the egalitarian Shapley values satisfy Sobolev’s reduced game consis-
tency for any game with at least two players, from the proof above it follows that for the
axiomatization it is suﬃcient to require this consistency only for games with at least three
players since the speciﬁc standardness property sets the payoﬀs in two player games.
Note that the reduced game of Sobolev (1973) is not the only reduced game with
respect to which the Shapley value is consistent. For example, the Shapley value satisﬁes
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consistency with respect to the reduced game of Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989). How-
ever, the equal division solution is not Hart and Mas-Colell consistent. Joosten (1996)
characterized the α-egalitarian Shapley value using α-standardness for two-player games
and an adapted version of Hart and Mas-Colell’s reduced game consistency where the re-
duced game depends on the parameter α. The main disadvantage of that characterization
therefore is that the parameter α appears both in the standardness and in the reduced
game property. Also the interpretation of the parameter α in the reduced game is prob-
lematic. However, we have shown here that all α-egalitarian Shapley values have the same
reduced game consistency property in common when considering Sobolev (1973)’s reduced
game.
Uniqueness of a solution satisfying α-standardness for two-player games and consis-
tency also follows from Yanovskaya and Driessen (2002) who show uniqueness of a solution
satisfying α-standardness for two-player games and a general reduced game consistency
where, similar to the above mentioned generalization of Hart and Mas-Colell’s reduced
game, parameters also enter the reduced game4. Thus, every solution in their class is char-
acterized by a diﬀerent reduced game consistency. However, our main purpose here has
been to show that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy the same reduced game consistency.
4 Monotonicity
Several mononoticity properties of solutions have been discussed in the literature. For
example, Young (1985) showed that the Shapley value is characterized by eﬃciency, sym-
metry and strong monotonicity5. Since all egalitarian Shapley values are eﬃcient and sym-
metric, the Shapley value thus is the only egalitarian Shapley value that satisﬁes strong
monotonicity. However, it turns out that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy the weaker
monotonicity property which requires that the payoﬀ of a player does not decrease if the
worth of the ‘grand coalition’ as well as all his marginal contributions do not decrease.
Axiom 4.1 (Weak monotonicity) A solution ψ satisfies weak monotonicity if ψi(N, v) ≥
ψi(N,w) whenever v(N) ≥ w(N) and v(S)− v(S \ {i}) ≥ w(S)−w(S \ {i}) for all S ⊆ N
with i ∈ S.
Note that this is a considerable weakening of the strong monotonicity property. Since the
worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is what is to be allocated by any eﬃcient solution requiring
4We gave the explicit proof of uniqueness in Theorem 3.4 since this is much shorter with the explicit
reduced game that we consider here.
5In van den Brink (2006) it is shown that the equal division solution is characterized by efficiency,
symmetry and coalitional monotonicity , where this last property states that the payoff of a player does
not decrease if the worths of all coalitions it is a member of do not decrease.
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that the payoﬀ of a player does not decrease if its marginal contributions do not decrease
irrespective of what is to be allocated is a very strong requirement. However, if the worth
to be allocated is not decreasing then this requirement on the payoﬀs seem reasonable for
a marginalistic solution.
It turns out that the class of egalitarian Shapley values is characterized by eﬃciency,
linearity, local monotonicity and this weak monotonicity6.
Theorem 4.2 A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, linearity, local monotonicity and weak
monotonicity if and only if it is an egalitarian Shapley value.
Since the proof for games with at least three players is diﬀerent from that for games with
at most two players, we prove this result in two lemmas. Let G3 and G2 be the class of
games with at least three, respectively with two, players.
Lemma 4.3 A solution ψ on G3 satisfies efficiency, linearity, local monotonicity and weak
monotonicity if and only if it is an egalitarian Shapley value.
Proof
It is straightforward to verify that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy these four properties
on G3. Now, suppose that solution ψ satisﬁes these properties on G3. If (N, v) is a null
game given by v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N , then eﬃciency and local monotonicity imply that
ψi(N, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N . (Note that local monotonicity implies symmetry.)
Next, we consider unamimity games (N, uT ) ∈ G3, T ⊆ N, T 
= ∅. We prove uniqueness
for unanimity games (N, uT ) by induction on |T |. First, suppose that |T | = 1. Local
monotonicity implies that there is a c∗ ∈ IR such that ψj(N, uT ) = c
∗ for all j ∈ N \ T .
For i ∈ T , local monotonicity further implies that ψi(N, uT ) ≥ c∗. So, for i ∈ T we
can write ψi(N,uT ) = c
∗ + α for some α ≥ 0. For i ∈ T , eﬃciency then implies that
ψi(N,uT ) = 1− (n− 1)c∗, and thus α = 1− (n− 1)c∗− c∗ = 1−nc∗. We obtain c∗ =
1−α
n
,
and thus
ψi(N,uT ) =
{
c∗ + α = 1−α
n
+ α if i ∈ T
c∗ = 1−α
n
if i ∈ N \ T,
(4.3)
with α ≥ 0. Weak monotonicity and the fact that all players in a null game earn zero
payoﬀ, implies that ψj(N, uT ) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N \T , and thus α ≤ 1. Since EDi(N,uT ) =
1
n
6Note that this is different from weak monotonicity in Malawski (2005) which is some kind of non-
negativity property stating that in any monotone TU-game all players earn a non-negative payoff. He
characterizes a class of solutions that contains the egalitarian Shapley values by efficiency, linearity, local
monotonicity and this non-negativity. However, not all solutions in his class satisfy Sobolev’s reduced
game consistency.
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for all i ∈ N , Shi(N, uT ) = 1 for i ∈ T , and Shi(N, uT ) = 0 for i ∈ N \ T , with (4.3) we
have ψ(N, uT ) = (1− α)ED(N,uT ) + αSh(N, uT ) = ϕα(N, uT ), α ∈ [0, 1].
Next we show that the weight put on the Shapley value is the same α for all singleton
unanimity games. Consider T ⊂ N , T 
= T and |T | = |T | = 1. Let T = {t}, T = {t}
and j ∈ N \ {t, t}. (Note that such a j exists since n ≥ 3.) Similar as above for (N, uT ),
it follows that ψ(N,uT ) = ϕ
α(N,uT ) for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Since weak monotonicity implies
that ψj(N, uT ) = ψj(N,uT ), we then have that ϕ
α
j (N, uT ) = ϕ
α
j (N, uT ). Since Shj(N, uT ) =
Shj(N, uT ) = 0 and EDj(N, uT ) = EDj(N,uT ) =
1
n
, it must hold that α = α.
Now, consider (N, uT ), 2 ≤ |T | < n. Proceeding by induction assume that we determined
ψ(N, uT ′) = ϕ
α(N, uT ′) for some α ∈ [0, 1] whenever |T ′| < |T |. If j ∈ N \ T then weak
monotonicity implies that ψj(N, uT ) = ψj(N, uT\{i}) for any i ∈ T . With the induction
hypothesis it then follows that ψj(N, uT ) = ϕ
α
j (N,uT\{i}) =
1−α
n
= ϕαj (N, uT ). With
eﬃciency it then follows that
∑
i∈T ψi(N, uT ) = 1−
∑
j∈N\T ψj(N, uT ) = 1− (n− |T |)
1−α
n
.
Since local monotonicity implies symmetry it then follows that ψi(N,uT ) =
1−(n−|T |) 1−α
n
|T |
=
1−α
n
+ α|T | = (1 − α)EDi(N, uT ) + αShi(N,uT ) = ϕ
α
i (N, uT ) for i ∈ T . Thus, ψ(N, uT ) =
ϕα(N, uT ).
For the unanimity game (N, uN ), local monotonicity and eﬃciency imply that ψi(N, v) =
1
n
for all i ∈ N .
For arbitrary (N, v) ∈ G3, uniqueness follows from linearity of ψ and the fact that v =∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )uT for every (N, v) ∈ G, with ∆v(T ) =
∑
H⊆T (−1)
|T |−|H|v(H) the Harsanyi
dividend of coalition T ⊆ N, T 
= ∅ (see Harsanyi (1959)). 
In proving that the payoﬀ of player t ∈ N in the unanimity game (N,u{t}) is equal to
the payoﬀ of player t ∈ N in the unanimity game (N,u{t}), in the proof of Lemma 4.3
we needed to compare these payoﬀs with those of another player i ∈ N \ {t, t}. Therefore
we need at least three players to apply this proof. Although we cannot apply this proof
for two player games, also on that class the four axioms of Lemma 4.3 characterize the
egalitarian Shapley values.
Lemma 4.4 A solution ψ on G2 satisfies efficiency, linearity, local monotonicity and weak
monotonicity if and only if it is an egalitarian Shapley value.
Proof
It is straightforward to verify that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy eﬃciency, linearity,
local monotonicity and weak monotonicity on G2. To prove uniqueness, let (N, v) ∈ G2.
If v is a null game then eﬃciency and local monotonicity again imply that ψi({i, j}, v) =
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ψj({i, j}, v) = 0. For two-player unanimity games ({i, j}, uT ), i 
= j, we distinguish the
following two cases. (i) If T = {i, j} then eﬃciency and local monotonicity imply that
ψi({i, j}, u{i,j}) = ψj({i, j}, u{i,j}) =
1
2
. (ii) Consider the case that |T | = 1. Let α =
2ψi({i, j}, u{j}) − 1, i.e. α is deﬁned such that ψi({i, j}, u{j}) =
1−α
2
= ϕαi ({i, j}, u{j}).
Then by eﬃciency we have ψj({i, j}, u{j}) = 1− ψi({i, j}, u{j}) = 1−
(
1−α
2
)
= α + 1−α
2
=
ϕαj ({i, j}, u{j}). Similar as in the proof of Lemma 4.3, local monotonicity implies that α ≥ 0
and weak monotonicity and the nulll game case imply that α ≤ 1. In van den Brink and
Funaki (2004) it is shown that on G2 any solution that satisﬁes eﬃciency, linearity, local
monotonicity and weak monotonicity also satisﬁes anonymity7. But then ψi({i, j}, u{i}) =
ψj({i, j}, u{j}) and ψi({i, j}, u{j}) = ψj({i, j}, u{i}). Thus, ψ({i, j}, uT ) = ϕα({i, j}, uT )
for |T | = 1. The proof of uniqueness for any two player unanimity game then follows from
linearity. 
Since for one-player games ({i}, v) the payoﬀ ψi({i}, v) = v({i}) follows by deﬁnition of a
solution, Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 yield the main result of this section as stated in Theorem
4.2. Note that, similar to Corollary 3.5, Theorem 4.2 characterizes the class of egalitarian
Shapley values using axioms that do not depend on the parameter α. Logical independence
of the axioms of Theorem 4.2 is shown by the following alternative solutions:
1. The solution ψ given by ψi(N, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ G satisﬁes the axioms
of Theorem 4.2 except eﬃciency.
2. The normalized Banzhaf value β given by βi(N, v) =
βi(N,v)∑
j∈N βj(N,v)
v(N) with βi(N, v) =∑
S⊆N
i∈S
1
2n−1
(v(S) − v(S \ {i})), i ∈ N , satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.2 except
linearity8.
3. For N ⊂ IN, let n(N) be the lowest labeled player in N , i.e. i ≥ n(N) for all
i ∈ N . Then the solution ψ given by ψn(N)(N, v) = v(N), and ψi(N, v) = 0 for all
i ∈ N \ {n(N)} satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.2 except local monotonicity.
4. The CIS-value given by CISi(N, v) = v({i}) +
v(N)−
∑
j∈N v({j})
n
for all i ∈ N (see
Driessen and Funaki (1991)) satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.2 except weak monotonic-
ity.
We end this section by remarking that in the proof of Theorem 4.2 weak monotonicity is
used for two purposes. First, it is used to show that a player who is a null player in two
7A solution ψ satisfies anonymity on C ⊂ G if for every permutation π : N → N it holds that ψi(N, v) =
ψπ(i)(N,πv) for every (N,v) ∈ C such that (N,πv) ∈ C , where the permuted game (N,πv) is defined by
πv(S) = v(∪i∈S{π(i)}) for all S ⊆ N .
8An axiomatization of this solution is given in van den Brink and van der Laan (1998).
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distinct unanimity games gets the same payoﬀ in both games. This is also established by
the null player constant property which states that the payoﬀ of null players is always the
same for games that have the same worth of the ‘grand coalition’, i.e. a solution ψ on
GN satisﬁes the null player constant property if ψi(N, v) = ψi(N,w) whenever i ∈ N is a
null player in (N, v) and (N,w) with v(N) = w(N). Second, weak monotonicity is used to
show that null players in a unanimity game earn a nonnegative payoﬀ. This also follows
from nonegativity which states that players in monotone games earn a nonnegative payoﬀ.
Therefore, in Theorem 4.2 weak monotonicity can be replaced by the null player constant
property and nonnegativity9.
5 Implementation
In the previous two sections we characterized the egalitarian Shapley values from a cooper-
ative viewpoint. Next we study these solutions from a non-cooperative perspective. In the
literature various implementations of the Shapley value can be found, see e.g. Gul (1989),
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) and Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). In this section we
adapt the last mechanism and obtain a two-level bidding mechanism implementing any
egalitarian Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome10.
This bidding mechanism is deﬁned recursively as follows. When there is only one
player, say i, in the game, this player simply gets its stand-alone payoﬀ, v({i}). Given the
rules of the mechanism for games with at most k − 1 < n players, the bidding game for a
set of k players proceeds in rounds. Dependent upon the strategies of the corresponding
players, the bidding game may have up to n rounds, each consisting of four stages. Let Nt
be the player set of the game with which the bidding game of each round t ∈ {1, ..., n} will
start.
Round 1 : N1 = N . Goto Stage 1.
Stage 1: Each player i ∈ N makes bids bij ∈ R for every j 
= i. For each i ∈ N , let
Bi =
∑
j =i
(
bij − b
j
i
)
be the net bid of player i measuring its ‘relative’ willingness
to be the proposer. Let i∗1 be the player with the highest net bid in this round.
(In case of a non-unique maximizer we choose any of these maximal bidders to
be the ‘winner’ with equal probability.) Once the winner i∗1 has been determined,
player i∗1 pays every other player j ∈ N\{i
∗
1} its oﬀered bid b
i∗
1
j . The ‘winner’ i
∗
1
becomes the proposer in the next stage. Goto Stage 2.
9Note that the null player constant property is weaker than weak monotonicity but nonegativity is not.
10A general approach to bidding mechanisms implementing solutions for cooperative games is discussed
in Ju and Wettstein (2006).
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Stage 2: Player i∗1 proposes an oﬀer y
i∗
1
j ∈ R to every player j 
= i
∗
1. (This oﬀer is
additional to the bids paid at stage 1.) Goto Stage 3.
Stage 3: The players other than i∗1, sequentially, either accept or reject the oﬀer. If
at least one player rejects it, then the oﬀer is rejected. Otherwise, the oﬀer is
accepted. Goto Stage 4.
Stage 4: If the oﬀer is accepted, then each player j ∈ N\{i∗1} receives y
i∗
1
j and player
i∗1 obtains v(N)−
∑
j =i∗
1
y
i∗
1
j . Hence, in this case the ﬁnal payoﬀ to player j 
= i
∗
1
is y
i∗
1
j + b
i∗
1
j , while player i
∗
1 receives v(N)−
∑
j =i∗
1
(y
i∗
1
j + b
i∗
1
j ). Stop.
If the oﬀer is rejected then with probability α ∈ [0, 1] player i∗1 leaves the game
and obtains her stand-alone payoﬀ v({i∗1}), while the players in N\{i
∗
1} proceed
to round 2 to bargain over v(N\{i∗1}). With probability (1 − α) ∈ [0, 1] the
game breaks down and all players, including the proposer i∗1, get zero payoﬀs at
this stage (and thus only the bids of stage 1 are transferred, i.e. the payoﬀ to
player j 
= i∗1 is b
i∗
1
j and the payoﬀ to the proposer i
∗
1 is −
∑
j =i∗
1
b
i∗
1
j .). Stop.
In the following rounds, the stages 1, 2 and 3 are the same as in round 1 but with the
reduced player set where the proposer in the previous round has left. However, at stage 4
of the following rounds there is no possibility of breakdown. To be complete we describe
the following rounds.
Round t, t ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} : Nt = Nt−1\{i∗t−1}. Goto Stage 1.
Stage 1: Each player i ∈ Nt makes bids bij ∈ R for every j 
= i. For each i ∈ Nt, let
Bi =
∑
j∈Nt\{i}
(
bij − b
j
i
)
, be the net bid of player i. Let i∗t be the player with the
highest net bid of round t. (In case of a non-unique maximizer we choose any
of these maximal bidders to be the ‘winner’ with equal probability.) Once the
winner i∗t has been determined, player i
∗
t pays every other player j ∈ Nt\{i
∗
t},
its oﬀered bid b
i∗t
j . The ‘winner’ i
∗
t becomes the proposer in the next stage. Goto
Stage 2.
Stage 2: Player i∗t proposes an oﬀer y
i∗t
j ∈ R to every player j ∈ Nt \ {i
∗
t}. (This
oﬀer is additional to the bids paid at stage 1.) Goto Stage 3.
Stage 3: The players other than i∗t , sequentially, either accept or reject the oﬀer. If
at least one player rejects it, then the oﬀer is rejected. Otherwise, the oﬀer is
accepted. Goto Stage 4.
Stage 4: If the oﬀer is accepted, then each player j ∈ Nt\{i
∗
t} receives y
i∗t
j and
player i∗t obtains v(Nt) −
∑
j∈Nt\{i∗t }
y
i∗t
j at this stage. Hence, in this case the
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ﬁnal payoﬀ to player j ∈ Nt \ {i
∗
t} is y
i∗t
j + b
i∗t
j +
∑t−1
k=1 b
i∗
k
j , while player i
∗
t receives
v(Nt)−
∑
j∈Nt\{i∗t }
(y
i∗t
j + b
i∗t
j ) +
∑t−1
k=1 b
i∗
k
i∗t
. Stop.
If the oﬀer is rejected then player i∗t leaves the game and obtains its stand-alone
payoﬀ v({i∗t}), while the players in Nt\{i
∗
t} proceed to round t + 1 to bargain
over v(Nt\{i∗t}).
Round n : Nn = Nn−1\{i∗n−1}. Apparently, Nn is a singleton coalition so that it is a
one-player game in this round. The game immediately stops such that player i ∈ Nn
gets its stand-alone payoﬀ v(Nn). So, its ﬁnal payoﬀ is v(Nn) +
∑n−1
k=1 b
i∗
k
i .
Note that this bidding mechanism is the same as that of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001), except for the possibility of breakdown after the oﬀer is rejected in the ﬁrst round,
and thus for the speciﬁc value α = 1 it is exactly the same as their mechanism. If the
game continues after this ﬁrst rejection then this possibility of breakdown does not occur
anymore, and the whole game can only be stopped by acceptance of all relevant players in
a certain round or rejection in a two-player bidding subgame.
Given the characteristic function v, we can calculate the ﬁnal payoﬀs of the players
who are assumed to be risk neutral in the mechanism. In case of rejection in the ﬁrst round,
the expected ﬁnal gain of proposer i∗1 is αv({i
∗}) −
∑
j =i∗ b
i∗
j , whereas every other player
j 
= i∗1 ﬁnally obtains b
i∗
j plus the expected payoﬀ due to the contingent (with probability
α) outcome of the mechanism continuing with player set N\{i∗1}. In case of acceptance of
the proposal in the ﬁrst round, the ﬁnal gain of i∗1 is v(N)−
∑
j =i∗
1
(b
i∗
1
j + y
i∗
1
j ), whereas the
ﬁnal gain of every player j 
= i∗1 is b
i∗
1
j + y
i∗
1
j .
Next we generalize the result of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) who showed
that for α = 1 this bidding mechanism implements the Shapley value for zero-monotonic
games. A TU-game (N, v) is zero-monotonic if v(S) ≥ v(S\{i})+v({i}) for all S ⊆ N and
all i ∈ S. It turns out that for any zero-monotonic game such that the ‘grand coalition’
earns a nonnegative worth, the given bidding mechanism implements the α-egalitarian
Shapley values as subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcomes. For T ⊂ N the restricted
game (T, vT ) ∈ G is given by vT (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T .
Theorem 5.1 Let α ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the bidding continues after rejection
in the first round, and let v ∈ G be a zero monotonic game with v(N) ≥ 0. Then the
outcome in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the bidding mechanism coincides with the
payoff vector ϕα(N, v).
Proof
Let (N, v) be a zero-monotonic with v(N) ≥ 0, and let α ∈ [0, 1]. We ﬁrst show that the
α-egalitarian Shapley value payoﬀ ϕα(N, v) is indeed an SPE outcome. We do this in three
steps.
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1. We ﬁrst explicitly construct an SPE that yields the α-egalitarian Shapley value ϕα(N, v)
as an SPE outcome. Consider the following strategy adopted by a player i ∈ N .
Round 1:
At stage 1, player i ∈ N announces bij = α(Shj(N, v) − Shj(N\{i}, vN\{i})) + (1 − α)
v(N)
n
for every j 
= i.
At stage 2, if i is chosen as the proposer, i oﬀers yij = αShj(N\{i}, vN\{i}) to every j 
= i.
At stage 3, if j 
= i is the proposer, i accepts any oﬀer that is greater than or equal to
αShi(N\{j}, vN\{j}) and rejects any oﬀer strictly smaller than αShi(N\{j}, vN\{j}).
11
At stage 1 of any round t, t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, player i ∈ Nt (i.e. i was not proposer in
any of the previous rounds) announces bij = Shj(Nt, vNt) − Shj(Nt\{i}, vNt\{i}) for every
j ∈ Nt \ {i}. (Clearly, players in N \ Nt do not have to choose an action in round t and
henceforth.)
At stage 2, if i is chosen as the proposer, i oﬀers yij = Shj(Nt\{i}, vNt\{i}) to every j ∈
Nt \ {i}.
At stage 3, if j ∈ Nt \ {i} is the proposer, then i accepts any oﬀer that is greater than or
equal to Shi(Nt\{j}, vNt\{j}) and rejects any oﬀer strictly smaller than Shi(Nt\{j}, vNt\{j}).
Round n: If i ∈ Nn is in this round, i will be the only player and gets its stand-alone payoﬀ
v({i}).
2. This proﬁle of strategies of all players in N yields acceptance in round 1. Since b
i∗
1
j +y
i∗
1
j =
α(Shj(N, v)− Shj(N\{i∗1}, vN\{i∗1})) + (1− α)
v(N)
n
+ αShj(N\{i∗1}, vN\{i∗1}) = αShj(N, v) +
(1 − α)v(N)
n
= ϕαj (N, v) for all j ∈ N\{i
∗
1}, any player who is not the proposer obtains
its α-egalitarian Shapley value payoﬀ. Moreover, given that following the strategies the
grand coalition is formed, the proposer also obtains her α-egalitarian Shapley value payoﬀ
ϕαi∗
1
(N, v) = v(N)−
∑
j∈N\{i∗
1
ϕαj (N, v).
3. To check that the above strategies constitute an SPE, ﬁrst recall Theorem 1 in Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), which implies that the subgame perfect equilibrium out-
come of each subgame starting from round 2 (irrespective of the proposer, its bids and
proposals in round 1) is the Shapley value payoﬀ vector of the corresponding game. Then
we further apply backward induction to verify that the given strategy proﬁle yields sub-
game perfectness at the stages of round 1. Note that at stage 4 no actions by players are
11Note that at stages 2 and 3 the non-proposers, respectively, the proposer do not have an action. The
same holds for the following rounds. At stage 4 no player (besides ‘nature’ in round 1) has an action but
only payoffs are transferred.
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chosen, but only payoﬀs are paid and (possibly) nature chooses whether the game contin-
ues or breaks down. Given the SPE outcome from round 2, if non-proposer j 
= i∗1 chooses
according to the given strategy proﬁle in stage 3 then (after all preceding non-proposers
accept the oﬀer of the proposer) j accepts any oﬀer from proposer i∗1 if and only if the oﬀer
is greater or equal to αShj(N\{i∗1}, vN\{i∗1}) which is its expected payoﬀ after rejection,
showing that the given strategy proﬁle yields an SPE in the subgame that starts when
non-proposer j 
= i∗1 has to choose to accept or reject the oﬀer at stage 3. By v(N) ≥ 0
and zero-monotonicity of v, v(N)−αv(N \ {i∗1}) ≥ α(v(N)− v(N \ {i
∗
1})) ≥ αv({i
∗
1}), and
thus the proposer prefers acceptance paying the minimal oﬀers for the non-proposers to
accept at stage 3, so y
i∗
1
j will be as just determined for stage 3.
To verify that the bids at stage 1 complete an SPE, note that all net bids are equal
to zero because for all i, j ∈ N the balanced contributions property of the Shapley value
(see Myerson (1980))12 implies that
b
j
i = α(Shi(N, v)− Shi(N\{j}, vN\{j})) + (1− α)
v(N)
n
= α(Shj(N, v)− Shj(N\{i}, vN\{i})) + (1− α)
v(N)
n
= bij.
Therefore, according to this strategy proﬁle at stage 1 all players are chosen as the proposer
with equal probability. Consider player j ∈ N . Decreasing (at least one of) its bids, j
will be chosen as proposer with probability zero. Which other player will be the proposer
depends on the way j decreases its bids. But given that all other players do not change
strategies, i.e. making bids and oﬀers according to the above strategies, player j would
still obtain its α-egalitarian Shapley value payoﬀ. Hence, j cannot increase its payoﬀ
by decreasing its bids. In order to further elaborate this, one can readily check that a
decreasing bid of j will not be part of an equilibrium because it will induce some (the players
whom j makes decreased bids to) of the others to decrease the bids without changing the
level of their net bids. If j increases (at least one of) its bids, then j will be the proposer
with probability one. But since the continuation of the game from round 2 (with this
proposer) does not change, the earnings of j in the subgame that is ‘entered’ does not
change. But j’s bid increased and therefore j’s total payoﬀ decreases. So, no player can
increase its payoﬀ by changing its bid, showing that the given strategy proﬁle is an SPE.
Thus, we have shown that the α-egalitarian Shapley value payoﬀ vector is indeed
an SPE outcome.
To prove that any SPE yields the α-egalitarian Shapley value as outcome, note that it
follows along the same lines as in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) that for any player,
12This balanced contributions property states that Shi(N, v) − Shi(N\{j}, vN\{j})) = Shj(N, v) −
Shj(N\{i}, vN\{i})) for all (N,v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N .
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his or her ﬁnal payoﬀs are the same regardless of the identity of the proposer. Next we
only have to show that in any SPE the ﬁnal payoﬀ received by each player coincides with
his or her α-egalitarian Shapley value payoﬀ. Note that if i is the proposer in round 1, her
ﬁnal payoﬀ will be v(N) − αv(N\{i}) −
∑
j =i b
i
j whereas if j 
= i is the proposer, i will
obtain ﬁnal payoﬀ αShi(N\{j}, vN\{j}) + b
j
i . Hence, since all net bids are zero and thus
all players are proposer with equal probability (which follows similar as in Pe´rez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001)), using a recursive formula of the Shapley value given in Maschler
and Owen (1989)13, the expected payoﬀ of player i equals
1
n
(
v(N)− αv(N\{i})−
∑
j =i
bij +
∑
j =i
(
αShi(N\{j}, vN\{j}) + b
j
i
))
(5.4)
=
1
n
(
v(N)− αv(N\{i}) +
∑
j =i
αShi(N\{j}, vN\{j})
)
= αShi(N, v) + (1− α)
v(N)
n
= ϕαi (N, v).

It can be seen from the proof of Theorem 5.1 that the condition of a nonnegative worth
for the ‘grand coalition’ and zero-monotonicity of the game (N, v) can be weakened to
α-zero-monotonic, α ∈ [0, 1], meaning that v(N) ≥ α (v(N\{i}) + v({i})) for all i ∈ N ,
and v(S) ≥ v(S\{i}) + v({i}) for all S ⊂ N , S 
= N , and all i ∈ S.
Further, note that (5.4) at the end of the proof above yields a recursive formula for
all egalitarian Shapley values that is constructed as follows:
ϕαi (N, v) =
1
n
∑
j =i
ϕαi (N\{j}, vN\{j})
+
1
n
(
v(N)− αv(N\{i})− (1− α)
∑
j =i v(N\{j})
n− 1
)
, for all i ∈ N.
Taking α = 1 yields the recursive formula of the Shapley value given in Maschler and Owen
(1989).
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we formulated the trade-oﬀ between marginalism and egalitarianism in co-
operative games by considering convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal
13This recursive formula is Shi(N, v) =
1
n
(
v(N)− v(N\{i}) +
∑
j =i Shi(N\{j}, vN\{j})
)
for all i ∈ N .
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division solution. We provided three main characterizations of these egalitarian Shapley
values. We ﬁrst showed that all these solutions satisfy the same reduced game consistency
that is introduced by Sobolev (1973). Second we showed that all egalitarian Shapley val-
ues satisfy weak monotonicity (which is a weaker version of strong monotonicity), and that
together with eﬃciency, linearity and local monotonicity this weak monotonicity character-
izes the class of egalitarian Shapley values. Finally, we showed that all egalitarian Shapley
values have a similar strategic implementation as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome in an extensive form bidding mechanism which is an adaptation of the one for
the Shapley value given in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), and only diﬀers in the
probability of breakdown at a certain stage of the negotiations. Since these solutions have
these important types of properties in common we consider the egalitarian Shapley values
as an important concept to make the trade-oﬀ between marginalism and egalitarianism.
Malawski (2005) obtains the egalitarian Shapley values by a procedure where for
every order of entrance to the ‘grand coalition’ player i ∈ N gets a share α in its marginal
contribution and the predecessors of i equally share the remainder of i’s marginal contribu-
tion. Taking the average over all orders of entrance yields the corresponding α-egalitarian
Shapley value as expected payoﬀs. In a similar spirit, Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007) allocate
for every order of entrance the surplus v(S)− v(S \ {i})− v({i}) instead of the marginal
contribution among the entrant i and its predecessor, and assign the worth v({i}) fully to
player i. This yields the convex combinations of the Shapley value and the CIS-value (see
the fourth example at the end of Section 4), the so-called generalized consensus values,
as expected payoﬀs. All generalized consensus values satisfy standardness for two-player
games but, except fot the Shapley value, do not satisfy Sobolev (1973)’s reduced game
consistency. Finding a reduced game consistency for the generalized consensus values is a
plan for future research.
In van den Brink and Funaki (2004) a class of equal surplus sharing solutions is
studied that includes the equal division solution, the CIS-value, the ENSC-value (i.e. the
dual of the CIS-value) and all their convex combinations. Further generalizations of the
egalitarian Shapley values and generalized consensus values consider convex combinations
of any of these equal surplus sharing solutions with the Shapley value (or even the more
general semi-values, see Dubey, Neyman and Weber (1981)).
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